interviews
Working at the Supranational Level
by Daniel Naujoks
July 31, 2019
This interview with Daniel Naujoks was conducted and condensed by frank news. It is part two of our conversation on The Mobility Mandala.
frank: Today, we often hear about a crisis of cooperation at the international level. It seems that many countries are reluctant to work together and many wonder about the place of the United Nations in today’s world. This is broad – but what influence does the UN have on nations today?
Daniel Naujoks: When we think about the influence of the UN it’s important to recognize that the UN isn't one entity. What we call “the UN” includes many different ways in which states interact with each other, often mitigated or moderated by certain entities of the UN. You have the General Assembly, which, for many people is the quintessential UN. And the Security Council – a highly political body and the only UN organ that has the power to take decisions infringing on states’ sovereignty. On the other hand, there is the UN of the many programs and agencies that have specific mandates and that work with governments and non-state actors to achieve something, like the UN Development Programme, the International Labour Organization, or the UN Environment Programme, to name a few.
When it comes to migration and displacement, we actually had several discussions on these topics at the General Assembly. In 2006, the UN organized the first high level dialogue on international migration and development, for which I was part of the organization team at the UN Population Division. In 2013, we had another high-level dialogue at the UN General Assembly. And after preparing and negotiating for two years, in December 2018, the global community adopted two new compacts. The UN adopted the UN Global Compact for Migration, for safe, orderly and regular migration, and the UN Global Compact on Refugees. These are non-binding agreements but the entire process of drafting these compacts was influential for spurring discussions among countries, between countries and civil society at the international level, and, even more importantly, at the national level.
Often we think of UN issues as matters at the supranational level, happening at the UN General Assembly hall here in New York or in Geneva. And that's true, that is an important venue. But, when we have a UN event or UN treaty, or in this case, a compact, there are also national stakeholders, human rights commissions, NGO networks, ministries at the national level, who have an interest in promoting certain issues. And they have consultations, the press picks up issues. Each country is a little different and it depends on the strength of certain stakeholders and their interests. For example, the U.S. government was largely absent from the process of the UN Global Compact for Migration.
Already in the beginning of the negotiations, the US declared, "We're out." Which, in my opinion, was not a very smart move, because even at that point, it was clear that it would be non-binding.
The risk of somewhat being held accountable would actually be low. And remaining in the discussions would have given the US a way to influence the content. But I think it was more about sending a political message to certain local constituents than an actual policy move in the international sphere.
What is remarkable is that even though the national government withdrew from the process, many U.S. cities said, "Can we be part of that?" New York, Chicago,and other cities really stepped in. Thus, in the end, there was a lot of participation in the U.S., even though the national government declared they don't want to have anything to do with it. So, sometimes, how the UN works is a little more complex than just what the official state department position is on an issue. And there are many venues. There are bilateral consultations, there are regional consultations on human trafficking, on labor migration and so on. There is a Global Forum on Migration and Development, the GFMD, which, since 2007, takes place every year. Governments come, they exchange notes on good policies, and on what can be done, mostly at the working level. At the working level, government officials cooperate and learn from each other. Again, it's non-binding. And the UN provides inputs, they chair sessions, they write background papers, they present case studies.
This is to exemplify that there are systems where policy learning happens in a much more informal setting, than through rigid rules-setting and treaty-making. This is something students in the UN Studies specialization here at Columbia’s School of International and Public Affairs, that I direct, focus on when studying global governance. There are many different ways in which local and national governments, countries’ specific ministries, institutions, and agencies, international organizations, NGOs, and other groups negotiate and collaborate.
And then in the developing world, of course, the UN has a different role, because they are not just advising, they're working with local partners and in actual programs, like funding. And they're advising governments directly on how to do things.
But even there, what people from the outside often don't understand, the UN cannot work without the explicit consent of the host government.
So, when Kenya says that they want to close the refugee camps for Somalia refugees, UNHCR can plead, "Oh, please, refugees have rights and camps are bad." But, unless the Kenyan government gives UNHCR authority to work on certain programs, and provides UNDP consent to implement initiatives on livelihood strategies targeting refugees, these agencies can't do much. This being said, because of certain power asymmetries and donor interests, the so-called technical assistance from UN agencies in the Global South has the potential to influence policy decisions and exemplifies how the work of the UN can have an impact. But the political leverage of many agencies is not as large as is often seen. Which is why there's a lot of bargaining in the background. The things that you don't see that are not official.
Can you give an example?
DN: An example for the fact that the UN has to always ask for permission to work on certain issues is the persistence of the use of refugee camps. For the last 15 to 20 years, we know that refugee camps are not good for refugees. In the very short term, in the immediate aftermath of an atrocity, of a civil war, of a calamity, in the case of a sudden influx, camps may make sense to provide shelter and food and medical services to a large number of people. But, even in the medium term, they're very bad for the human development outcomes of people.
They lend themselves to a range of human rights violations, because people live in close vicinity to each other, people who are very heterogeneous among themselves. Just because they're all refugees, just because they're all from one country, doesn't mean they all get along well.
Camps generally don't provide sufficient economic opportunities for people, et cetera. That's why for some time now, we know that limited humanitarian responses to large refugee and IDP movements are not good for development. Definitely not for those people who are displaced, but mostly equally for surrounding communities. I actually developed a role-play simulation on the reasons for and against refugee camps and participants understand quite clearly the mix of international development and human rights logic with local politics and interests.
Addressing the shortcomings of classic humanitarian approaches, different UN agencies have been very strong in advocating for a more development-based strategy. For example, in the Syrian context, there has been the 3RP, the regional refugee and resilience plan, which is headed by UNDP and UNHCR, with I think, about 270 partners. It’s implemented in Syria’s neighboring countries, Jordan, Turkey, Lebanon, Iraq, and Egypt. In addition to each country’s national plan there's a regional plan, which focuses not only on the humanitarian side but also development side. UNDP has been leading these efforts to provide livelihood support, skills, training, et cetera. But even there, we see that the implementation is hampered by a lot of challenges. Take Jordan. In the 2013 donor conference in London, Jordan pledged to give work permits to 200,000 Syrian refugees. They were very committed at the highest level of government.
But, a year later, there were almost no permits for refugees, and everyone asked why. We did a project with Better Work Jordan, which is a collaboration between the International Labour Organization and the World Bank. BetterWork Jordan published a report that my students drafted on why Syrian refugees did not get more official work permits. There are many reasons why employers couldn't employ refugees or couldn't expand their production. The refugees could only work in the export-oriented zones, mostly in the garment sector. They couldn't work in other areas. There was a distance they had to travel. Refugees often didn't want these jobs for a variety of reasons. There were many bottlenecks in the bureaucratic procedure to get work permits. In brief, there were many challenges at the supply side, the demand side, as well as on the bureaucratic transaction side.
These issues combined led to a situation in which this great policy that was mediated by the UN and other donors to actually empower refugees to be economic actors, didn't have the impact people had hoped for. While much of what the UN does can have important impacts, this shows that what can be done at the national level depends a lot on national priorities and politics. How politicians are afraid of negative impacts for the local voting populations. And then, of course, it has also to do with the commitment of the international donors to actually put in money to say, "Yes, we will not only give you minor funds to warehouse refugees but we will partner with you to empower them and your populations." Part of the agreement with Jordan that I mentioned was a pact with the EU. The EU said, "If refugees are employed you can export garments and other goods from export-oriented zones to us duty free." The idea was to use trade and the increase in production in the Jordanian garment sector as a way to increase employment opportunities for refugees. A great idea.
But, you probably need to do more to help Jordanian products to be competitive on the EU market. There's also a time lag. Even if you open up the market right away, these products may not satisfy the EU standards for garments. So, there are many things that the partners need to do to support these endeavors and to really make sure that local leaders are not afraid that if they open the labor market, if they open chances for local integration, that in two years, donors will pull out. And then, they will get stuck with the additional population without the support financial community. So, that's where the UN can help a lot. But, without real commitments from large donor countries or any countries to resettle and share the responsibility for refugees, there's only that much the UN can do.
Thank you so much for your time.
Image via Hannah Wallace Bowman (above).
interviews
Q&A with Catalina de Onís
by Catalina de Onís
February 8, 2019
Catalina M. de Onís is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Civic Communication and Media at Willamette University. Her research and teaching engage Latina/o/x studies, de/coloniality, race, environmental and energy studies, gender, and fieldwork. She is an affiliated faculty member with the Latin American Studies program and the Sustainability Institute.
How would you define Energy Democracy?
Energy democracy is essential for advancing energy justice, including by foregrounding the experiences, concerns, and needs of community members most impacted by different energy projects. A shift to renewable energy can replicate unjust power relations, so it’s important to be critical of “big green” projects that lack local community involvement and direction. For years, many Puerto Rican energy democracy advocates have been calling for roof-top solar and the need to have companies invest in local energy projects, rather than exporting the money to another place.
Elsewhere, I have defined “energy justice” as:
“Informed by environmental and climate justice, energy justice is concerned with how People of Color and low-income communities are impacted by global climate disruption, energy poverty, energy vulnerability, and decarbonization (i.e. transitioning from high-carbon energy sources, such as petroleum and coal, to low-carbon energies, such as wind and solar). Energy justice also struggles against the exploitation of indigenous lands and communities for high-risk and toxic energy development, from nuclear to fracked gas, and also recognizes the importance of sustainable jobs in the renewable energy sector and achieving energy security and sovereignty in relation to infrastructure, distribution, and access. Thus, this movement and discourse strives for direct community engagement to advance sustainable practices, including considerations of how, where, and for/by whom energy is produced, distributed, consumed, maintained, and disposed of (Sovacool & Dworkin, 2014).”
Is Energy Democracy inherently political?
Yes, energy democracy always involves politics and power struggles over energy sources and infrastructure, how that infrastructure comes to be, who decides, how it is maintained, and what policies advance or impede such projects. The political system in the United States, Puerto Rico, and in other countries throughout the world is entwined with energy industry interests that often have no problem with treating some communities as sacrifice zones to maximize their profits. There are large barriers to full participation in Puerto Rico, as evinced by the Fiscal Control Board’s website and the “public comment” process that requires submitting responses online and in English. As a result, the majority of Puerto Ricans in Puerto Rico are not able to participate in their preferred language. Furthermore, energy conversations among liquefied gas (LNG) industry officials, members of la junta fiscal/the control board, and local politicians are discussing lifting the suffocating 1920 Merchant Marine Act, or the Jones Act, only for the purposes of importing LNG. This exception epitomizes how corporate energy interests and their political allies are willing to waive one aspect of an arbitrary law only to the extent convenient for them, rather than addressing widespread calls from civil society to lift this act entirely to transform Puerto Rico’s dependence on US ships and imports. One of the LNG tankers making the route between Florida and Puerto Rico is “Taino,” named after the Indigenous peoples who faced the brutalities of colonization.
What does the history of energy operations look like in Puerto Rico? What sort of legacies are left?
Puerto Rico’s heavy reliance on imported fuel oil from South America and liquefied gas from Trinidad and Tobago and increasingly from the United States shows how energy sovereignty has been denied. During the height of Operation Bootstrap, in the mid-1900s, Puerto Rico was used as a test site for the petrochemical industry; the energy required was enormous to support this component of US-empire building. Local artist Rafael Trelles illuminates the problem of abandoned industries, job loss, and environmental contamination in his moving 2011 artistic piece: “Monumento al Fracaso” (Monument to Failure). Another artistic intervention against environmental injustice, titled “Contaminado,” emphasizes the problem of coal ash dumping and the impacts on human health in the southern region of Puerto Rico. These artistic efforts have unfolded synergistically with grassroots movements agitating for Puerto Ricans’ self-determination over their own energy futures.
How do you begin to move past them?
First, it’s important to call attention to the toxic legacies that scar Puerto Rico’s landscape and that harm the health of local communities. For example, a 2016 epidemiological study found that various diseases and respiratory problems are disproportionately high in communities that are nearby fossil fuel plants. So, instead of moving past these toxic legacies, it’s important to note that many communities continue to live with this contamination on a daily basis. Given this reality, it’s important to note the urgency of a just transition to grassroots, renewable energy alternatives that both improve human and environmental health conditions and create local jobs to grow struggling local economies.
Can you describe the grassroots led efforts for energy happening in Puerto Rico right now?
Numerous grassroots solar energy projects are unfolding throughout Puerto Rico. The longtime environmental justice group Casa Pueblo has been a large solar advocate and leader. Another effort, which existed pre-Hurricane Maria, is Coqui Solar in southern Puerto Rico, home to the two most polluting power plants in the Big Island, and yet many residents in this area often face power outages and were some of the last to have power restored after the 2017 hurricane season. The project involves already-installed solar panels on the community center and the development of resident-installed solar panels on surrounding homes. Service-learning with Drs. Efrain O’Neill-Carrillo and Marcel Castro and their engineering students has been at the heart of this collaboration. Also with university ties, El Instituto Nacional de Energia y Sostenibilidad Isleña (the National Institute of Island Energy and Sustainability, or INESI) is involved in many projects and has been a champion of energy democracy for years, including hosting “dialogue tables” with various members of civil society.
How have citizens responded to these efforts?
Those who are locally impacted tend to respond with excitement about the possibilities, but it’s important to not suggest that every Puerto Rican supports solar. It’s important to not treat Puerto Ricans as a monolith.
How has this work adapted since Hurricane Maria? Is resilience built into each energy project?
There’s now greater financial and academic support for these grassroots, roof-top solar projects from outside groups. For example, local Puerto Rican scholars and community activists have been supporting visits and collaborations of numerous university groups—from the University of Oregon to MIT. These collaborations can be helpful, if they are committed to a long-term, sustainable relationships and put the interests and needs of local communities first. Otherwise, colonial relational patterns can too easily develop.
What policy is central to this work?
Energy policy must center the realities of impacted communities. Too often in Puerto Rico, there’s the façade of public participation. However, from language to technology barriers, a dramatic transformation must be made before approaches to energy projects in Puerto Rico begin to be about the people instead of maintaining fossil fuel energy interests and their political cronies.
What sort of new policy would benefit your efforts and incentivize more participation?
The efforts of INESI create a vision for energy democracy, based on years of conversations that include diverse energy actors. Ayuda Legal Puerto Rico also is an important legal resource.