interviews
Labor and the White House
by Dave Weigel
March 31, 2021
This interview with Dave Weigel, national reporter covering politics for the Washington Post, was conducted and condensed by franknews and Payday Report.
DW | The White House's involvement in the Amazon union drive was a big surprise. I mean, we know where it could have originated, the union talked to the White House; they have kind of an open door with Biden that they didn't have with Trump. We know that Faiz Shakir, Bernie Sanders’ campaign chairman, and his group, Perfect Union, got involved. So, there was public pressure.
The fact that the White House and the president released that video was a big deal to people. And, he made this decision to get involved very early on in his presidency. It was within his first 50 days. He decided to do what hadn't been done before and give a message in support of the union. It was a very careful message. The new labor secretary, Marty Walsh, when asked specifically about Amazon, responded in more general tones.
But, no matter what happens, if you are in for a penny, you are in for a pound.
A lot of previous presidents, including Barack Obama, said a lot less about these union drives and, in doing so, limited their own exposure. If the drive didn't work, people didn't say that the president supported something that didn't work. The fact that Biden made a statement, early on, when it wasn't clear how this was going to go, is a real political statement of what they thought was important.
frank | How do you think his background plays a role in this?
He's always leaned in really hard and identified with workers in the same way he's tried to identify with different civil rights movements. Joe Biden has always wanted to be seen as the kind of person who is coming from Scranton, who has lived through the sixties, and who wants to jump to the front of the march if there is a struggle happening.
He frames everything in terms of fairness. He's not as natural as other members of the party in talking about this. When Bernie Sanders talks about this, for example, he talks about greed, he names CEOs, he says nobody deserves that much money, he talks about a maximum wage and how there should be no billionaires at all. Biden doesn't go that far. Biden has never gone after Jeff Bezos. He's never gone after individual heads of companies the way that Sanders does. He does this sort of a "Hey man, these guys are under assault, somebody needs to stick up for them."
That is something that he has always wanted to be part of his brand. Even when he was voting for trade deals like NAFTA as a Senator, he was never really comfortable. He had the same ideological mindset as a lot of the Democrats in the eighties and the nineties. He did it because he saw that that was the way things were moving and he voted strategically. But, the stuff that fired him up was when he could side with workers. It is the same thing with the projects he took on under Obama when he was Vice President.
During the Democratic primary, he didn't get the same amount of labor support that Hillary Clinton did, but, Sanders didn't get it either. There wasn't the same sort of a landslide of labor to get in early and say, this is our candidate. Instead, they were demanding more of the candidates.
I would cover presidential primary events with the Teamsters in Cedar Rapids or the Building Trades in DC and you would kind of look to the level of applause as an indicator. The interesting thing is that at those events Sanders would lay out the things he did and what he wanted to pass. Biden would go on at length about non-compete clauses and about wage theft and things like that. It was less, "I have studied all of the papers on this and I've decided this is my policy," and more of "this seems unfair and I'm against this thing."
I think the Democratic Party is increasingly understanding what labor can mean for them strategically.
Republicans have gotten kind of tangled up on labor. They have done better with union households, but they are basically the party of deregulation still. They've never really moved on the labor part of their messaging. That makes it easier for Biden to compete for these workers. When it comes down to it, Republicans want “right-to-work." Josh Hawley, who branded himself as a working-class candidate, for example, supports a national right-to-work.
Biden was very concerned with winning back more union households. Union workers were saying, “Democrats had the presidency for 16 years. What do they do for us?” Biden didn't have all the answers that labor wanted, but he was making a lot of specific promises about how he was going to act. He talked about infrastructure spending and about how he was going to run the NLRB and how he was going to approach employers. It was less than Sanders did, but that's way more than Democrats had done in the past.
I mean, the McCain/Romney era Republicans had no appeal to the sort of voters who voted for Obama twice and then voted for Trump. Biden only peeled back maybe 10% of them depending on where you're talking about, but it has made life easier for Democrats.
This fight has in large part been framed in the context of continuing a battle for civil rights. Do you see Biden lean into that messaging?
Biden did not really lean to the racial justice aspect or the civil rights legacy aspect of this labor fight. When the congressional delegation here came down a couple of weeks before the vote, they were much more explicit. Someone like Jamal Bowman or Cori Bush is much more comfortable saying that than Biden. That is the thing about Biden. He basically sets boundaries. He says what his position is and backs off and lets the action happen without his constant commentary. It's very different than Trump in that way too. And that's different than the Sanders position. And it's different than what Warren said her position would be as president.
Can you give us context on how or why you started covering this story?
I started covering the Amazon drive because of the president and members of Congress intervening. I mean, labor decided to get involved months before, but the fact that Democrats were getting involved was new. It has been interesting to monitor their investment in this over other Democratic Party causes.
There's a little bit of intervention from the Democrats, but not, I'd say equal to what Amazon is doing. They are not the advertisements on TV. We all know the Democratic party is kind of involved, but it is not the same political project that I've seen in other places.
There are two stories that kind of were happening at the same time; they have merged, but not completely. One is this labor drive, which is smaller than most drives that have succeeded. It is not overwhelming. You don't see labor signs everywhere you go. But, on the other hand, the level of national involvement is kind of new.
Had Biden said nothing, there would have been a story, but it wouldn't involve the White House, it wouldn't involve the Democratic Party, and it might not involve the PRO Act.
And I think that's going to change because of this.
New interview w/ @daveweigel @PaydayReport
— frank news (@FrankNewsUS) April 6, 2021
"The White House's involvement with the Amazon drive was a big surprise ... Previous presidents, Obama comes to mind, said a lot less. The fact that Biden did that early on is a political statement of what they thought was important." pic.twitter.com/MwYlmqE4xQ
That was a big decision Biden made to be a part of this.
Right. And that political story is interesting. The story here is much more independent. A lot of the people who've come in to help canvas are from smaller groups. You have Black Lives Matter and DSA groups from the area, but you don't have the Democratic Party getting involved in a huge way. I think that is something that people will revisit after the vote.
Should the Democratic Party, like most left parties in the world, be very involved with labor? Should they always take the side of labor?
Most social democratic parties are labor parties and they build up from there. Their coalition includes labor unions. In the British Labour Party, for example, labor has a role in electing the leadership. That is not the case here. That's the conversation I think they're going to start having when this votes over. For example, if there are, and the union says there are, hundreds of people around the country calling them saying, "Hey, I have some questions about what I can do at my fulfillment center in my town," that will be a question for Democrats.
And if Amazon wins, do you get spooked? Amazon has been very punchy in their PR. They might say that a bunch of elite Democrats stood with the union and the workers stood with Amazon. That is very comfortable turf for Amazon to be on, and that leaves a big question open for Democrats. If the union succeeds, throw all of that out the window. I think the lesson that everyone would take in that case would be that if it takes less than a three-minute video from the president to get momentum for something like this, then we should keep doing that. As we talk, I don't know the answer to that question. I think that is something that is going to be answered when the votes are in.
interviews
An Interview with Sasha Davis on the Economic Power of China
by Sasha Davis
April 9, 2018
This interview with Sasha Davis, a professor at University of Hawaii, Hilo, was conducted and condensed by Tatti Ribeiro for frank news.
Recently, the economic power of China in the region is influencing many Asia-Pacific locales to question hosting U.S. bases. People in places like Okinawa, Guam, Saipan, and Jeju Island, and South Korea more generally with the THAAD controversy, are concerned about how hosting U.S. military activities hurts their ability to attract Chinese tourists and investment.
OK. Yeah, I believe that one of the things influencing the way in which some of the places in the region are viewing American bases, and more American military operations and such, is the fact that China is becoming economically more powerful in the region. There are islands all around, like Okinawa, but also further out in the Pacific like Guam, Saipan, that are increasingly interested in attracting Chinese investment and Chinese tourists. And in the case of Japan, like overall last year, the figure I believe is around 6.5 million visits from Chinese tourists, and many of those to Okinawa. And so this has really become one of the major engines of the economy in some of these places. And so there's been a reluctance on the part of some of these countries to increase the militarization of the islands in a place like Okinawa, where the U.S. military is so prominent. I think there's a belief that some of the military landscapes being so close to some of the tourist oriented landscapes, can be a bit of a conflict for the industry.
What is the official U.S. military response to the pressures we’re facing from China?
Oh that's a good question. You know, I think that the U.S. military response has been a little more focused on what the Chinese military has been doing, as opposed to some of the investments and economic pressures. Things such as the way the U.S. has been doing the freedom of navigation exercises in the South China Sea, or the recent visit by the USS Carl Vinson I believe to Vietnam, as a way of sort of shoring up security relations with Vietnam. Kind of to show some solidarity against the Chinese there. But I haven't seen as much in terms of U.S. military pushback against the economic influences of China in some of these places. And I think part of that is that it's not necessarily read as a security threat. But I’m sure it's on the minds of military planners and people in the Department of Defense in Washington D.C. I'm just not sure if I've seen much of a military response to that Chinese economic influence.
Should there be a military response?
Well I'm not sure if the response is necessarily a military one as much as a political and potentially economic one. I think that it comes down to a little more with the U.S. you know, thinking about how it shores up its security relationships in the region. I think it needs to think about the fact that from the perspective of these islands, they have to look at the financial opportunities the United States might be bringing. And I'm not sure if that's today, quite as obvious as the potential positives of Chinese investments, or Chinese tourist spending in that part of Asia and the Pacific. And I think one thing that needs to be done is there probably needs to be more coordinated efforts with the State Department and the Department of Interior for places like Micronesia that fall under those parts of the U.S. federal government. Things like trying to cut aid to those countries, or having any kind of restrictions about migration abilities from places like Micronesia. It's something that isn't going to attract or keep those countries kind of oriented towards the United States.
How do you compare potential economic opportunity from China to say, security from the U.S?
Yeah it's interesting because I was just reading, and I think it was in some of the press coverage of the of the U.S. aircraft carrier visiting Vietnam, where there was a quote by somebody in Vietnam that says, you know, everybody likes the Chinese money but nobody trusts the Chinese. And of course maybe that's a little bit of a hyperbole saying everybody wants the money, and everybody doesn't trust them. But I think that is definitely an attitude I've seen across the region where a lot of the countries are very interested in the economic development, but they are wary of what the ulterior motives might be of that investment in places like in Micronesia, or Guam, or Saipan. There are real concerns over, is the Chinese government trying to buy influence? Or potentially through these large infrastructure projects, potentially putting military assets in there later. That comes up both locally and in U.S. concerns for the region.
Do you have any particular fears about what those consequences might be?
Yeah, I think some of the perspective I try to take from doing research in the region is to take the view of trying to kind of stand on the islands in the region and look outward, and look at what are the things that say the Chinese offer or what are the pressures coming from China, or the influences. And then looking at the United States and saying, what are the pressures or influences coming from the United States? And I think the islands that are there in the middle have to kind of try and navigate their own path through this larger context. And I think that there's been a pretty big concern about the consequences of American military activities in places like Guam, in places like Okinawa, and also in places like the Marshall Islands.
I think traditionally there has been some opposition that has kind of arisen in these islands because of the negative environmental and social consequences of that militarization. And so this is where a lot of the people, that are like the independence movement, say that more sovereignty movements in the region are usually kind of against U.S. political power or what have you. But now China is kind of entering the scene and there are a lot of concerns about if the islands in the region cozy up to China. Is this sort of changing one kind of imperial power for another? You know, is one more dangerous than the other, and this sort of thing, or destabilizing. On the other hand it also presents some opportunities now for governments in the region to kind of play one power off of the other. For things like getting investment, or aid, or just like you know, political attention.
I think China has been doing a pretty effective job of sort of doing a charm offensive if you will, in places like Micronesia. They'll have the head of Micronesia come to China and roll out the red carpet, and the fans, and promise aid and all the stuff.
And in terms of the fears for the region I think mine sort of center on obviously hoping that there are still peaceful relationships that are maintained between the U.S. and China. Partially because if you look at most of the military strategies that involved military or military conflict, they involve those battles happening over those islands, that use them as bases and as battle spaces. Particularly around Okinawa, the East and South China Sea. But also further back with places like Guam, which would obviously be targeted. So I think from the perspective of those islands, they would want to make sure that those relationships between the big powers don't really sour.
Do you think economic pressure from China could change the dynamic between the U.S. and South Korea?
I think that there could be some. You know I certainly don't see the South Korean government abandoning their military alliance with the United States as long as there is a North Korea that is threatening. I can't imagine that that would be seen as kind of politically palatable. But yeah, the rising economic influence of China does mean that South Korea has to think more about kind of watching their steps in a sense. In terms of the way in which U.S. militarization in South Korea is perceived as being a threat to China. I think the THAAD controversy is a great example of this, where the South Korean economy, particularly the tourist economy, but also some of their exports and some of their companies that operate in China, were absolutely hammered by what is essentially a Chinese boycott of South Korea after they agreed to allow U.S. missile defense to come into South Korea. Because China looked at it as being aimed towards them, or as kind of destabilizing the deterrence that Chinese missiles could play in Asia. And so I think that South Korea has to be conscious of that.
But in terms of like, the base in Pyeongtaek and that sort of thing, you know, there are other domestic concerns in South Korea from people that want less dependence on U.S. military, or chafe at the local effects of militarization, of the operation of the bases, and the way the land was taken around Pyeongtaek, and then some of the environmental and social problems with the exercises.
But I think overall, that South Korea maybe now, sort of has to think about playing both sides a little more than they may have been in recent decades, and I think maybe a model for this would be like the Philippines. The Philippines was once, even a few years ago, very staunchly pro U.S, very anti China. The stuff from the South China Sea was really reaching a fever pitch and then politically things shifted. Where now you've got the Philippines really playing both sides and looking for Chinese investment. They're kind of putting the U.S. at more of an arms length, at least rhetorically. But yet they also are still certainly keeping those military connections in place in the Philippines, and don't want to alienate the U.S. so much that they feel like they might be at the mercy of Chinese power in the South China Sea. So I could see South Korea kind of taking a similar tact. But you know, the South Korean leadership is a little more reasonable than the Philippine leadership right now. But I think their context is somewhat similar.
That’s really interesting.
Yeah. I mean one thing that I think is important to kind of reiterate, is one of the things that I think is an under-appreciated aspect of the US's ability to maintain security relationships in these places, like South Korea, or Okinawa, or Guam, or other areas in the Pacific. I think that Americans need to understand that being next to these large military installations is seen as a sacrifice, as a burden. You know, there are major environmental and social consequences of doing that, and Americans shouldn't take this for granted. That these will always be there, and they can operate however they want to without having to care what people in Okinawa or Guam or South Korea think. Because many bases and training ranges have been negatively impacted by people in these places having opposition to the bases. So I think it's important that Americans recognize that more complex terrain these bases are in.
I agree we just take it as it is. It’s important to think critically about it, which obviously you do as a profession. But for everybody else to look at it through that lens.
Another key thing like said, I don't know if Americans appreciate, is even if there's an agreement between say the U.S. and Japanese government, if enough people in Okinawa don't want that base to be there, then it will get worse. It doesn't get built, or gets delayed for years, and years, and years, and so there really needs to be, I think more engagement at the local levels and recognition that things have to be done differently. I think to kind of respect local wishes in some of these areas.
What about in other regions? How is China’s presence in Africa affecting U.S. presence there?
Well I don't have a lot of on the ground knowledge of what's going on other than I know the different U.S. military installations and operations that have been going on across the Sahel, and also in the Horn of Africa, and how China is increasing both military presence in those areas side by side with their investments. And you look at the whole, One Belt One Road project, of China developing the infrastructure to connect China to Africa, particularly to East Africa. And they are having more economic, political, and military operations and focus on that region. And it's also a region that now the U.S. is paying a little more attention to as well. Partially because of the existence of the different kind of fundamentalist Islam groups in the area and their connections to terrorism in Africa. So I think there are some similarities there with Africa as well as in the Pacific. I think that they operate in those regions where, it's sort of between the empires if you will.
You have these larger powers like China or like the United States, or you know even large countries like India, that are kind of trying to project their ability to facilitate their security projects in those areas. And when you look at places like Africa, or even the Western Pacific, they're on the edges, and the contact zone between these larger powers, and they’re borders of a kind. And so I think that it's because those areas are unstable, and because it's not necessarily clear, kind of, who's sphere of influence they may be under, it's a place where there's potential for conflict or at least for competition between the different great powers. And so because of that it can definitely cause destabilization both in Africa or in the Indian Ocean, or even out in the Pacific.
Does it seem like a play for hegemony on China’s part?
Absolutely it is.
You know it's interesting because as you know, some of the literature on China's traditional conceptualizations of hegemony, and what they politically strive for — a lot of their political tactics and strategies have been about preventing US hegemony. Not so much necessarily to produce their own. Because there's actually a lot of concern that what comes with being a global hegemon in terms of you know, all that you've got to do to back it up militarily. It costs a lot of money. Chinese strategies that I read about, tend to imagine their preference as sort of a multipolar world where Chinese interests are kind of not hemmed in as much by a U.S. kind of hegemony. But that's not necessarily replacing it. But certainly they want more wiggle room. And I think some of their moves towards the west, towards Africa, into places like Central Asia, come from a concern with U.S. power in the western Pacific
Chinese military and political strategists read the U.S. strategies of what war in the Pacific might look like. And most of the U.S. strategies are centered around being able to blockade China's east coast, not let trade in or out, and keep them hemmed in.
I think that plays into their strategies of aiming towards Central Asia and towards Africa. It is also about kind of having an escape route I guess from an American power that's amassed in the western Pacific.
Right. That makes sense. Well, thank you again for your time.
Sure! No problem.